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“Alternative dispute resolution” or “ADR” has reached a paradoxical 
moment: it is both ubiquitous and at risk of extinction as a distinct concept and 
field. The use of ADR has expanded exponentially since the Pound Conference 
of 1976, the event recognized as a catalyst for the widespread development of 
ADR in the United States.1 ADR is no longer “alternative,” but mainstreamed 
throughout courts, legal institutions, government, corporations, and society.2 
Every law school offers ADR courses and specialized programs to varying 
degrees.3 Given its focus on conflicts and process, dispute resolution weaves 
through every area of substantive law.4 
ADR’s pervasive “success” may have the unintended consequence of 
diluting its distinctiveness and quality. ADR has become synonymous with 
myriad processes—negotiation, mediation, settlement conferences, 
arbitration, restorative justice, collaborative law, dispute system design, 
private judging, negotiated rulemaking, and the list continues.5 For some, 
ADR essentially means “anything but litigation”—with much confusion about 
the differences between various types of disputing processes and the 
relationship of ADR to the law. 
The problem gets worse within particular branches of ADR, in which 
underlying process definitions and theoretical underpinnings are unclear. 
Mediation, for example, often equates to any attempt to settle a case outside 
of court, regardless of the quality or coerciveness of that process. As Nancy 
Welsh once observed, mediation “has become the new ‘Kleenex’ or the new 
‘Xerox.’ Those breakthrough products became so successful and ubiquitous 
 
1 See THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE (A. Leo 
Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979). 
2 See, e.g., Thomas O. Main, Mediation: An Unlikely Villain, 34 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 537 (2019) (arguing that mediation led federal courts to abandon trials and promote 
settlement). 
3 Every law school offers ADR courses as upper-level electives, some have 
incorporated ADR components into the required curriculum, and others have ADR 
specialty programs and centers. See Michael Moffitt, Islands, Vitamins, Salt, Germs: Four 
Visions of the Future of ADR in Law Schools (and a Data-Driven Snapshot of the Field 
Today), 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 25 (2010) (analyzing survey of ADR curriculum 
at U.S. law schools). 
4 See id. at 45 (noting ADR professors teach across the law school curriculum).  
5 The American Bar Association Dispute Resolution Section identifies at least twenty-
two different dispute resolution processes. See Dispute Resolution Processes, ABA 
SECTION OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/resources/DisputeResolutionPro






that others quickly copied them,” but in ways that undermine the quality and 
unique characteristics of the original product.6 
ADR has become so popular in name, fractured in practice, and 
jumbled in theory7 that it risks a metaphorical “genericide.”8 In trademark law, 
“genericide” occurs when a product name is used so widely, and incorrectly, 
in the public lexicon that the mark becomes generic and confusing.9 Instead of 
being a product of distinct quality, excessively popular brands such as 
Kleenex, Aspirin, Xerox, Band-Aid, etc., become coterminous with an entire 
category of (potentially inferior) goods, no longer unique and worthy of 
special protection. In short, the mark loses its ability to act as a source 
identifier.10 Ironically, the more successful a brand name, the more likely it 
suffers genericide. 
Analogously, the ADR name has been applied to so many different 
processes and concepts that its meaning has become rather muddled and its 
 
6 Nancy A. Welsh, Musings on Mediation, Kleenex, and (Smudged) White Hats, 33 U. 
LA VERNE L. REV. 5, 11 (2011). 
7 This is true not only for ADR generally, but also for the constituent branches of 
ADR, especially negotiation and mediation. See KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH, MEDIATION: 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 26 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that within the ADR field “few items 
spark more controversy than the definition of mediation”); Adrian Borbély, Noam Ebner, 
Chris Honeyman, Sanda Kaufman & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, A “Grand” Unified 
Negotiation Theory . . . in Context, 2017 J. DISP. RESOL. 145, 157 (noting cacophony of 
negotiation theories and concluding that a “grand,” unified negotiation theory would be 
difficult because negotiation theory is context-specific). 
8 For a simple explanation of genericide, see Whitson Gordon, How a Brand Name 
Becomes Generic, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/24/smarter-living/how-a-brand-name-becomes-
generic.html (“If a brand name is understood by the public to refer broadly to a category 
of good and services rather than a brand’s specific good or service, a company may be at 
risk of losing its trademark.”).  
9 See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING 




10 See, e.g., Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (ASPIRIN 
generic for acetyl salicylic acid); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 85 F.2d 75 
(2d Cir. 1936) (CELLOPHANE generic for plastic wrap); King-Seely Thermos Co. v. 
Aladdin Indus., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963) (THERMOS generic for insulated vacuum 
containers). Additional examples can be found in the “Trademark Graveyard.” Trademark 
Graveyard, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
https://www.uspto.gov/kids/graveyard.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2020). 





governing principles diluted.11 Judicial, commercial, and institutional 
enthusiasm for and propagation of ADR processes outpaced the development 
of an ADR academic field in the legal academy and body of theoretical 
literature.12 Many ADR processes—instituted largely based on efficiency 
grounds—developed as “atheoretical enterprises,”13 with the underlying 
normative values, ethical constraints, and governing standards unclear or 
perverted when institutionalized.14 
In 1985, nearly a decade after the Pound Conference, political scientist 
Christine Harrington observed that the broad scope and fragmentation of the 
ADR movement made it “difficult to talk about alternative dispute resolution 
as a movement or field.”15 In 2020, the ADR field is well embedded in the 
legal academy. ADR derives from a “rather promiscuous or multi-heritage 
ancestry” that includes intellectual and theoretical influences from a “broader 
pastiche of the social sciences (anthropology, political science, international 
relations, sociology, psychology, history, economics, and game theory) and 
 
11 See Moffitt, supra note 3, at 29 (“Like many areas, ADR struggles with boundary 
definition”). 
12 See Richard C. Boldt, Problem-Solving Courts and Pragmatism, 73 MD. L. REV. 
1120, 1125 (2014) (exploring how “problem-solving” courts emerged as an “atheoretical 
enterprise”); Jennifer W. Reynolds, Games, Dystopia, and ADR, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 477, 484 (2012) (“The market economy of alternative processes has produced a 
dizzying array of dispute resolution offerings. Whether these offerings represent actual 
progress or just additional ‘gaming of the system’ is an important inquiry for ADR scholars 
to undertake.”).  
13 Boldt, supra note 12, at 1125 (noting that the development of problem-solving 
courts has been an atheoretical enterprise guided by a “pragmatic set of instincts”); see 
also Katherine R. Kruse, Learning from Practice: What ADR Needs from a Theory of 
Justice, 5 NEV. L.J. 389, 394 (2004) (“Alternatives to litigation are institutionalized, not 
because they are most appropriate,” but because they are the most expedient). That is not 
to say the field lacks a theoretical canon. The point is that ADR innovations and practice 
often developed more quickly than the theorization of the field. A forthcoming book, 
DISCUSSIONS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE FORMATIVE ARTICLES (Art Hinshaw, Andrea 
Kupfer Schneider & Sarah Rudolph Cole eds., forthcoming 2021), collects some of the 
seminal articles with commentaries from ADR scholars.  
14 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale 
of Innovation Co-Opted or the “Law of ADR,” 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991) [hereinafter 
Pursuing Settlement]; Nancy A. Welsh, Do You Believe in Magic?: Self-Determination 
and Procedural Justice Meet Inequality in Court-Connected Mediation, 70 SMU L. REV. 
721 (2017) (analyzing potential reforms to promote procedural justice in court-based 
mediation); Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s 
Justice Got to Do with It?, 79 WASH. U. L. REV. 787 (2001). 
15 CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY AND 






their more multidisciplinary social activist spinoffs, such as peace studies, 
social movement theory and practice, and conflict resolution.”16 
As a relatively young field within law schools, however, we continue 
to grapple with who we are, where we fit, and what we should be in our 
teaching and scholarship.17 From its inception, the field has been mired in a 
bipolar “litigation” versus “settlement” straw man sketched by ADR critics.18 
This intellectual scrimmage is healthy to the extent it forces the ADR field to 
continuously reexamine and articulate its purpose and relationship to 
governing legal norms and legal institutions more precisely. But it also has 
been a distraction. Framing the field as “anything but litigation” keeps the field 
saddled by the misperception that the ADR field is universally anti-litigation 
and settlement-centric. 
The objective of the theoretical debate about “adjudication” versus 
“settlement” has never been a zero-sum game.19 The debate serves the valuable 
 
16 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution and Human 
Problem Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution in a Multidisciplinary Context, 54 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 4, 11–12 (2004) [hereinafter From Legal Disputes] (footnotes omitted). See also 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual Founders of 
ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Mother and Fathers of 
Invention] (exploring the interdisciplinary theoretical roots of the ADR field).  
17 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the “Vanishing Trial”: The Growth and 
Impact of “Alternative Dispute Resolution,” 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843, 845 (2004) 
(“The first obstacle to an understanding of the role of ADR is the sheer breadth and 
diversity of activities to be taken into account, a breathtaking range of approaches and 
strategies that we lump under the heading of ‘ADR’ (an outdated acronym that survives as 
a matter of convenience).”) Some ADR scholars and practitioners engaged in an online 
“theory of change” conversation about the future of the ADR field. See THEORIES OF 
CHANGE FOR THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION MOVEMENT: ACTIONABLE IDEAS TO REVITALIZE 
OUR MOVEMENT 19 (John Lande ed., 2020).  
18 Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 
1660, 1660, 1663 (1985) (criticizing Fiss’s Against Settlement as attacking “a straw man” 
and a “caricature”). See Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 
(1984). See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical 
and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2663–64 
(1995).  
19 See Amy J. Cohen, Revisiting Against Settlement: Some Reflections on Dispute 
Resolution and Public Values, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2009) (proposing that 
“Fiss’s overarching allegiance was less to specific institutional forms than to particular 
moral ideals. His arguments therefore transcend a straightforward distinction between 
adjudication and ADR.”); Michael Moffitt, Three Things to Be Against (“Settlement” Not 
Included), 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1203, 1245 (2009) (“Because settlement and litigation are 
coevolved, symbiotic processes, to stand against one is to stand against the other.”) In the 
words of Mary Parker Follett, who theorized the notion of constructive conflict in the 
1920s, “We should never allow ourselves to be bullied by an ‘either-or’.” Mary Parker 
 





purpose of scrutinizing the underlying normative values, uses, limitations, and 
impacts of various disputing processes on law and society.20 ADR raises 
important questions about whether courts and legal institutions are the only 
valid “authority” for the generation and enforcement of community norms. 
Should individuals have the choice to opt out of judicial adjudication and 
develop their own self-determined approach to their conflict? Is it appropriate 
to mandate non-judicial methods of dispute processing?21 The question of 
whether private dispute processing options undermine public values and legal 
rights, or provide a valid alternative source of decision-making authority, 
remains an important one to explore. That nuanced perspective often gets lost 
at the intersection of the rapid institutionalization of ADR based largely on 
“efficiency” grounds, and the critical interrogation of these processes in ADR 
scholarship. 
Defining ADR as any non-litigation process renders ADR rather 
generic and not particularly distinctive. The lack of an overarching theoretical 
conception and scope portends the field’s potential genericide. While this 
metaphor may be dangerous in suggesting that ADR is simply a brand (which 
it is not), it is unquestionable that there is much confusion, in both theory and 
practice, about ADR generally and its constituent parts. We need to reclaim 
and clearly define the field’s overarching focus, theoretic precepts, and 
scholarly agenda. We need a clear answer to the question: what does the ADR 
field study and teach and why does it matter to the law and legal education? 
We need a robust dispute resolution field in law schools now more 
than ever. Our society is experiencing intense political polarization22 and 
 
Follett, Constructive Conflict, in MARY PARKER FOLLETT: PROPHET OF MANAGEMENT: A 
CELEBRATION OF WRITINGS FROM THE 1920S 86 (Pauline Graham ed., 2003). 
20 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 18, at 2664 (observing that the adjudication vs. 
settlement debate “while useful for explicitly framing the underlying values that support 
our legal system, has not effectively dealt with the realities of modern legal, political, and 
personal disputes”); See id. at 2655 (the question has always been “when, how, and under 
what circumstances should cases be settled?”) (emphasis in original). 
21 To make my biases on this question clear, I believe ADR processes should be 
voluntary, not mandatory. That includes mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in employment 
and consumer adhesion contracts, which impairs access to justice, and mandatory 
mediation. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme 
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 637 (1996). But see Roselle 
L. Wissler, The Effects of Mandatory Mediation: Empirical Research on the Experience of 
Small Claims and Common Pleas Courts, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 565 (1997). 
22 Of course, as historian David Moss writes, democracy “has always been a contact 
sport.” DAVID A. MOSS, DEMOCRACY: A CASE STUDY 3 (2017). He continues: “Words like 
‘cooperation’ and ‘consensus’ may sound appealing and even comforting, but American 







social isolation,23 challenging norms of democratic civil discourse. 
Community-based, dialogic ADR processes, such as restorative justice, are 
being applied to promote social justice goals in many different areas of 
substantive law.24 Online dispute processes are emerging at break-neck speed, 
presenting profound normative questions for the law and legal institutions.25 
And, of course, ADR is the way that nearly all legal matters are resolved.26 We 
study and teach this stuff—the sources, cycle, and psychology of conflict;27 
the forms, normative goals, design, and impacts of various methods of dispute 
and conflict processing in legal, organizational, and community-based 
contexts;28 the theory and practice of negotiation and facilitated 
communication in bilateral, multi-party, institutional, and international 
contexts.29  
To prevent “genericide” of their brands, companies invest tremendous 
effort to protect their marks so the public uses them accurately. As the ADR 
 
principally of harmony but of conflict—sometimes intense conflict—mediated, generally, 
by shared ideals.” Id. See Pew Research Center, Political Typology Reveals Deep Fissures 
on the Right and Left (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.people-press.org/wp-
content/uploads/sites/4/2018/09/10-24-2017-Typology-release.pdf; Pew Research Center, 
The Partisan Divide on Political Values Grows Even Wider (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://www.people-press.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2017/10/10-05-2017-Political-
landscape-release-updt..pdf.  
23 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY (2001). This sense of social isolation has been compounded by the 2020 
coronavirus pandemic, which has forced us to remain “socially distanced” from each other.  
24 See infra Part I(C). 
25 See, e.g., ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE: A TREATISE ON 
TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab, Ethan Katsch & 
Daniel Rainey eds., 2012); Robert Condlin, Online Dispute Resolution: Stinky, Repugnant, 
or Drab, 18 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 717 (2016). 
26 See infra Part I(A). 
27 See, e.g., BERNARD MAYER, THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE (2000); JAMES A. SCHELLENBERG, CONFLICT RESOLUTION: 
THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 39–102 (1996); Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer 
Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and 
Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437 (2008); Menkel-Meadow, Mothers 
and Fathers of Invention, supra note 16. 
28 See infra Part II.  
29 See, e.g., Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interest, Skills, and 
Selves, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 501 (2008); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Shattering 
Negotiation Myths: Empirical Evidence on the Effectiveness of Negotiation Style, 7 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 143 (2002); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the 
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem Solving, 
31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984) [hereinafter Toward Another View]; Gerald B. Wetlaufer, 
The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, 85 GEO. L.J. 369 (1996).  





field approaches a symbolic “mid-life” moment—nearly fifty years after the 
Pound Conference—it is time for renewed critical self-reflection about what 
ADR is, is not, and should be in modern legal thought and education. We need 
to define today’s dispute resolution field—which now reaches far beyond the 
traditional trifecta of negotiation, mediation, and arbitration—and reexamine 
its foundational normative values and governing principles This project is 
urgent: as many of the pioneers of the ADR field retire, some law schools are 
not replacing them in a time of budget constraints.30 
This article explores the modern scope and relevance of dispute 
resolution in law and legal education. Part I considers what ADR is, and 
equally important, is not. It seeks to clarify several points of confusion about 
the dispute resolution field that arise, in part, from the three words that 
comprise our abbreviation. Part II reconceptualizes the work of the modern 
ADR field as “conflict process theory and strategy,” drawing lessons from 
Legal Process theory. A “conflict process” framing of the field may help to 
define and guide our collective scholarly and teaching agenda into the future. 
This project is too large for one article. My hope here is to present a unifying 
framing of the field as a starting point for continued scholarly conversation as 
the next generation of ADR scholars takes the helm. 
 
II. WHAT’S IN A NAME? THE MUDDLE WE CALL “ADR” 
 
Ask anyone in your law school what ADR means and you may get an 
oversimplified,31 wrong,32 or very long answer that recites myriad processes 
and concepts, without a clear unifying theoretic conception.33 Few incoming 
law students know what ADR means. Many people outside of our field 
typically view ADR as one “black box,” lumping all processes together 
without appreciating the nuances between them. Worse, they view us as 
Pollyannaish proselytizers who believe that ADR can magically erase human 
conflict and produce a peaceful utopia.34  
 
30 See John Lande, What Will Be the Future of ADR in US Legal Education?, 
INDISPUTABLY BLOG (Jan. 24, 2019), http://indisputably.org/2019/01/what-will-be-the-
future-of-adr-in-us-legal-education/. 
31 This takes the form of thinking that ADR consists of only one process, typically 
mediation. 
32 This typically takes the form of confusing different processes, such as thinking 
mediation and arbitration are identical.  
33 I am guilty of this. It results from knowing too much about ADR.  
34 My esteemed colleague and friend Bob Condlin has written extensively about this 
perception of ADR and communitarian negotiation theories. See Robert J. Condlin, ADR: 







This confusion comes as no surprise. Semantically, we are a bit of a 
puzzle. We are the only field in the legal academy represented by an 
initialism.35 Psychologists teach us that such abbreviations can be alienating 
and mentally taxing for those outside of the field.36 Furthermore, all three 
words that comprise our field’s moniker—Alternative, Dispute, and 
Resolution—are incomplete and define us in limiting ways. I do not advocate 
for a new name per se. There is great value, after all, in having broad name 
recognition.37 ADR is a convenient shorthand (especially with word limits in 
law reviews). Nevertheless, unpacking the misperceptions arising from our 
descriptor may help us to identify a unifying conception of the field and put 
our future agenda into sharper relief. 
 
A. “Alternative:” A Grounding but Confusing Term 
 
First, let us consider “alternative,” which, on the one hand, serves as 
a helpful reminder that a range of processes—formal, legal adjudication to 
informal, self-determined approaches—exist for addressing conflicts and legal 
claims. “Alternative” emphasizes that the rule of law and judicial process are 
the predominant means for vindicating legal rights, maintaining social order, 
and resolving disputes in a democratic society. With courts as the guiding 
standard-bearer and enforcer of the law, individuals may opt for informal, 
 
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 291, 299–300 (2020) [hereinafter ADR: Disputing with a Modern 
Face] (arguing that some in ADR field assume that “ADR methods and systems” will 
transform “disputants themselves from ‘risen apes’ to ‘fallen angels’” and form a 
“peaceable kingdom” or utopia); Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining with a Hugger: The 
Weaknesses and Limitations of a Communitarian Conception of Legal Dispute Bargaining, 
or Why Can’t All Just Get Along, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 (2008). Jennifer 
Reynolds urges ADR scholars to unpack “the utopian mythology of ADR” and critically 
examine the potential harm of ADR processes on participants and society. Reynolds, supra 
note 12, at 483. 
35 Technically, ADR is an “initialism” rather than an acronym. See Initialism, 
MERRIAM WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/initialism (last visited May 1, 2020). 
36 Andrew H. Hales, Kipling D. Williams, & Joel Rector, Alienating the Audience: 
How Abbreviations Hamper Scientific Communication, OBSERVER (Jan. 31, 2017), 
https://www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/alienating-the-audience-how-
abbreviations-hamper-scientific-communication. 
37 “The Artist Formerly Known as Prince,” a rock icon from the 1980s, offers a 
cautionary tale about how difficult it is to change one’s well-recognized public persona. 
After all of the hubbub, he changed his name back to Prince. See Emily VanDerWerff, 
Why Did Prince Change his Name to a Symbol?, VOX (Apr. 21, 2016), 
https://www.vox.com/2016/4/21/11481686/prince-name-change-symbol-why. Hat tip to 
Professor Lydia Nussbaum for this observation. 





private, and self-determined processes. If those processes do not result in an 
agreement, judicial process and the rule of law remain as a safety net and the 
final word.38 
“Alternative” processes allow the parties most involved in a conflict 
to develop their own mutually agreeable outcomes, perhaps to blunt the 
potentially harsh or unsatisfying results that may result from judicial 
adjudication.39 For example, a tenant may prefer to negotiate a payment plan 
with a landlord rather than have an eviction judgment on her record; divorcing 
parents may wish to work out custody and visitation plans on their own; 
companies with on-going dealings may prefer to negotiate a deal to retain 
positive business relations; an offender may want a chance to make amends 
and avoid a criminal record. For others, the notion of an alternative system 
prompts mistrust and concerns about a potentially abusive regime that will 
force uninformed or unrepresented parties into settlements, trading legal rights 
and justice for harmony and peace. 
Yet, “alternative” is misleading to the extent it suggests that informal 
dispute processing is unusual. That is certainly inaccurate in modern society,40 
and may have never been true.41 A study of religion, philosophy, and the 
 
38 I frequently reassure students in the Mediation Clinic who express frustration if the 
parties do not reach agreement in a day-of-trial mediation: the mediation process is not a 
failure if the parties do not settle. That is what self-determination means. The worst thing 
that happens if the parties do not reach agreement is that a smart judge down the hall 
decides their case according to the rule of law.  
39 Here I am referring to consensual negotiation-based processes rather than 
arbitration, which is an adversarial adjudicative process. 
40 Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 597 (2005) 
(noting that adjudication practices “have shifted” and that ADR “increasingly dominates 
the landscape of procedure”); Marc Galanter, World of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach 
About Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 268, 268–69 (1984) (stating that “[o]n the 
contemporary American legal scene the negotiation of disputes is not an alternative to 
litigation[;] . . . it is the central core.”). 
41 KOVACH, supra note 7, at 28–29 (noting that mediation and informal dispute 
processes trace back thousands of years in ancient China, Japan, Greece, and many other 
cultures). See also Robert D. Garrett, Mediation in Native America, 49 DISP. RESOL. J. 38, 
38 (1994) (discussing peacemaking processes used in Native American culture); KOVACH, 
supra note 7, at 31 (explaining that much of the modern ADR movement built upon the 
mediation and arbitration processes developed in the early 1900s to avoid labor-
management strikes and industry shutdowns); WILLIAM E. SIMKIN & NICHOLAS A. 
FIDANDIS, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 25 (2d ed. 1986) 
(explaining that Congress created the Department of Labor in 1913, authorizing the 
Secretary of Labor to serve as a mediator for labor disputes); DEBORAH M. KOLB, THE 
MEDIATORS 7 (1983) (explaining that in 1947, Congress created the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service, which continues to mediate labor disputes for companies engaged in 






common law reveals that humankind has always used informal processes as 
the predominant way to address conflicts and promote a range of normative 
objectives.42 Given the imprecision of the term, many in the field use the 
descriptor “dispute resolution”43 or change the “A” in ADR to mean 
“appropriate” dispute resolution.44  
Under this (non-alternative) framing, the quintessence of the law itself 
is dispute resolution.45 Litigation is one process among a continuum of dispute 
processing strategies. As Jeffrey Seul observed: “The popular image of 
litigation has become so bleak, one can easily forget that an essential purpose 
of litigation is to resolve disputes, not to perpetuate them.”46 Indeed, Robert 
Pushaw has examined how the role of the court as a “dispute resolver” for 
 
42 Douglas Lind, On the Theory and Practice of Mediation: The Contribution of 
Seventeenth-Century Jurisprudence, 10 MEDIATION Q. 119, 120 (1992) (explaining that 
“[e]ven a casual review of jurisprudential history shows that legal philosophers have for 
centuries pondered the practical forms and theoretical justification of various ADR 
techniques” such as mediation and arbitration); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) 
(discussing the relationship of law to private ordering); Condlin, ADR: Disputing with a 
Modern Face, supra note 34, at 296 n.15 (observing that the differences between litigation 
and ADR “bleed into one another, of course, so that litigation and informal dispute 
resolution systems work in tandem with, as much as independently from, one another and 
have done so since the days of the Common Law and Equity.” (citing Henry Smith, Equity 
as Second Order Law: The Problem of Opportunism (Harv. Pub. L. Working Paper No. 
15–13, Jan. 15, 2015) (describing the relationship of Equity to the Common Law))). See 
also Carli N. Conklin, Lost Options for Mutual Gain? The Lawyer, the Layperson, and 
Dispute Resolution in Early America, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 581 (2013) 
(providing a historical analysis of arbitration in colonial America). 
43 John Lande & Jean R. Sternlight, The Potential Contribution of ADR to an 
Integrated Curriculum: Preparing Law Students for Real World Lawyering, 25 OHIO ST. 
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 247, 248 n.2 (2010) (arguing “[t]he term ADR gives the false impression 
that litigation is the norm and all other forms of dispute resolution are unusual. Also, 
grouping all non-litigation approaches together under one rubric is problematic because 
mediation and arbitration, just to name two processes, differ tremendously from one 
another.”).  
44 Janet Reno, Lawyers as Problem-Solvers: Keynote Address to the American 
Association of Law Schools, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5, 8 (1999) (urging lawyers to practice 
“appropriate dispute resolution”); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 18, at 2689–90 (arguing 
that “appropriate” should replace “alternative” to describe dispute resolution processes).  
45 STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT 35 (2000) (“[T]he skillful management 
of conflicts is among the highest of human skills.”); ADR: Disputing with a Modern Face, 
supra note 34, at 305 (“Conflict is one of the defining features of much legal work and 
resolving it is one of the legal system’s principal tasks.”).  
46 See Jeffrey R. Seul, Litigation as a Dispute Resolution Alternative, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 336, 336 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone 
eds., 2012). 





private “controversies” is embedded in Article III of the Constitution.47 Private 
ordering—or contracting for specialized tribunals or procedural rules—is 
common in most areas of law, especially in international and commercial 
contexts.48 Of course, most disagreements do not evolve into formal legal 
“disputes” or cases, with most people “lumping it” or using informal or 
community-based ways to address the matter.49 
The word “alternative” creates another misimpression for law 
students: it suggests that there is a binary, static choice between litigation and 
ADR in legal practice.50 To the contrary, there is an interdependent, fluid 
relationship between formal and informal processes.51 Throughout the life of 
a complex civil case, for example, the parties and their counsel may attempt 
to negotiate or mediate, then proceed with discovery and motions for summary 
 
47 Robert J. Pushaw Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual 
Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 531 (1999) (explaining that 
while the phrase “cases or controversies” has been collapsed over time into one concept 
for justiciability doctrine, this merging of “cases and controversies” is historically 
inconsistent with the framers’ understanding of the terms. “Cases” were matters that 
required exposition and reasoned analysis by the court to establish precedent. 
“Controversies” required the court to be a neutral “umpire” and perform a dispute 
resolution function. In other words, “[t]he federal courts’ primary function in ‘Cases’ is 
exposition, whereas in ‘Controversies’ it is dispute resolution.”). 
48 See Resnik, supra note 40.  
49 William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming…, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 
649 (1980–1981). 
50 Jean R. Sternlight, Separate and Not Equal: Integrating Civil Procedure and ADR 
in Legal Academia, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 681, 689 (2005) (explaining that the separate 
teaching of litigation and dispute resolution processes gives students the false impression 
that “there is little or no fluidity between litigation and other processes. That is, law 
students often imagine that lawyers say to clients: ‘We will negotiate or mediate rather 
than litigate this dispute.’”). 
51 See Jeffrey R. Seul, Settling Significant Cases, 79 WASH. L. REV. 881, 881 (2004) 
(arguing that “[l]itigation and negotiation are complementary, mutually reinforcing social 
processes, and each has a legitimate role to play in our nation’s moral discourse and the 
evolution of social norms.”); MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL 
ANALYSIS, at viii (1981) (arguing that “mediation and litigation are invariably intimately 
interconnected and interactive rather than distinct alternatives for conflict resolution.”). 
This is true in the criminal context as well, with most cases resulting in a negotiated plea 
bargain rather than a trial. See Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144 (2012) (observing that 
plea bargaining “is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice 
system.”); Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Cynthia Alkon, Bargaining in the Dark: The Need 






judgment, followed by additional attempts at settlement negotiations or 
mediation before, during, and even after a trial.52  
“Alternative” also incorrectly implies that those in the field oppose 
litigation as a method of dispute resolution. Most ADR legal scholars53 are not 
“against litigation,” adversarial processes, or competitive negotiation tactics. 
Many come to the field from litigation backgrounds and understand the 
interconnection among all disputing processes. Indeed, some private ADR 
processes involve adversarial litigation—such as arbitration, private judging, 
and neutral evaluation—albeit in a conference room rather than a courtroom, 
with a private third-party decision maker rather than a judge, mediator, or 
facilitator. 
Thus, ADR explores the notion of “process pluralism”54 or “fitting the 
forum to the fuss.”55 ADR legal scholars study and teach the theoretical 
underpinnings, uses, limitations, design, impacts, and risks of various dispute 
processing options—from self-determined, problem-solving based models 
(negotiation, mediation, collaborative law, restorative justice), to authoritative 
adjudicative processes (arbitration and litigation), to pre-dispute systems 
design and conflict prevention.56 This pluralistic approach is consistent with 
the view that conflict is inevitable and can be a constructive or destructive 
force, depending upon how the parties involved handle it.57  
As every litigator and procedural scholar understands, the structure, 
governing rules, and quality of process profoundly affect outcomes. Process 
matters—procedural rulings have, over time, affected everything from the 
 
52 See Moffitt, supra note 19, at 1244 (suggesting that “[p]erhaps the future of law 
school curricula will be one in which the line between litigation-focused courses and 
settlement-skills-focused courses will be blurred. Litigation and settlement are so 
intertwined in practice that I would think it difficult to teach them as though they were 
distinct.”). 
53 I say “ADR legal scholars” here deliberately. An “anti-law” sentiment exists among 
some non-lawyer conflict resolution practitioners and scholars who theorize that those 
most involved and affected by the conflict should determine norms and social order. See, 
e.g., Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1, 3–4 (1977).  
54 Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes, supra note 16, at 10–11.  
55 Maurice Rosenberg, Resolving Disputes Differently: Adieu to Adversary Justice?, 
21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 801 (1987); Frank E.A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching 
Cases and Dispute Resolution Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading to a Mediation-
Centered Approach, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 10–32 (2006); Frank E.A. Sander & 
Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide to Selecting 
an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49 (1994); ROBERT MNOOKIN, BEYOND WINNING 367 
(2000) (discussing how lawyers use a multitude of procedural skills).  
56 See infra Part II(A). 
57 See infra Part I(B). 





initial consideration of who has “voice” and the opportunity to be heard,58 to 
questions about who has decisionmaking authority,59 to the range of available 
remedies, to the ultimate outcome.60 ADR scholars are proceduralists who 
study and teach the impact of process choices, including dynamics “for 
designing, choosing, and advising about what processes to use for what 
purposes.”61 
In the final analysis, “alternative” may be most useful in keeping alive 
the continual juxtaposition of the underlying values, operation, and outcomes 
of judicial process with private and community-based conflict processes. 
Alternative means different, but not necessarily better. Judicial and informal 
dispute processes can serve as mirrors and checks on each other’s failures and 
excesses. The creation of alternative processes, for example, offers insights 
into the perceived procedural or substantive shortcomings of the law and 
traditional litigation. Likewise, legal norms inform the ethical limits and 
potential process dangers of private conflict structures. As Amy Cohen 
observed, the word alternative “signals that the field, as it changes over time, 
remains a window into how scholars and reformers conceptualize the 
problems with the center and imagine possibilities for transformation.”62 
 
 
58 See generally Welsh, supra note 14; Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, 
Procedural Justice and the Rule of Law: Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 1 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 2 (2011) (exploring how “psychological construct” of 
“procedural justice, provides an important perspective on how ADR systems can help 
maintain societal values that are consistent with the rule of law.”);Trina Grillo, The 
Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991); Amy J. 
Cohen, Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, and the Problem of Scale, 14 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 51 (2009) (arguing that scaling certain dispute resolution models may 
perpetuate existing social inequalities); Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It’s Not True: 
Challenging Mediation Ideology, J. DISP. RESOL. 81 (2002); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea 
or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 
74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996).  
59 This is the adjudication versus settlement debate discussed supra pp. 3–4.  
60 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011) (restricting class actions); 
AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351–52 (2011) (expanding the scope 
and enforceability of mandatory arbitration in consumer and employment contexts); 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686–87 (2009) (limiting the ability of civil rights plaintiffs 
to seek redress by heightening pleading standards).  
61 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Peace and Justice: Notes on the Evolution and Purposes 
of Legal Processes: Inaugural Lecture of the A.B. Chettle, Jr. Chair in Dispute Resolution 
and Civil Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 553, 580 n.113 (2006) (urging that the theory and 
practice skills associated with “process diversity and variation” should be taught as 
“[p]rocess in law schools”). See also Lande & Sternlight, supra note 43, at 248. 
62 E-mail from Amy Cohen, Professor of Law, Ohio State University Moritz College 






B. “Dispute:” A Central, but Incomplete, Part of the Story 
 
The bulk of ADR theory and practice focuses on, in the words of Frank 
Sander, “varieties of dispute processing.”63 The word “dispute” accurately 
describes the core of the field, but is incomplete. “Dispute” sounds reactive in 
nature, focused on matters that have already evolved into an oppositional 
posture or litigation. The broader concept of “conflict” better captures the full 
scope of our work.64 Although most, including Merriam-Webster, would 
consider “conflict” and “dispute” to be synonymous terms, in ADR theory a 
conflict is simply a difference of some sort that may, or may not, transform 
into a formal legal dispute.65 As Carrie Menkel-Meadow explains, “dispute 
resolution in law has expanded to include the fuller story of human conflict 
situations.”66 
Mary Parker Follett, one of the adopted intellectual founders of the 
field, explained that conflict is “neither good nor bad” and can be a 
constructive or destructive force.67 Follett theorized: “[a]s conflict—
difference—is here in the world, as we cannot avoid it, we should, I think, use 
it. Instead of condemning it, we should set it to work for us.”68 Follett posited 
“three main ways of dealing with conflict: domination, compromise and 
integration.”69 Domination means “a victory of one side over the other.”70 In 
Follett’s account, domination “is the easiest way of dealing with conflict, the 
easiest for the moment but not usually successful in the long run.”71 The use 
of compromise or settlement—in which “each side gives up a little in order to 
 
63 Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in Addresses Delivered at the 
Nat’l Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Admin. Of Justice, 70 
F.R.D. 111 (1976). 
64 See Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes, supra note 16, at 7.  
65 FOLLETT, supra note 19, at 67 (defining “conflict” as “difference”). See also 
William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . . 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 
(1980-81) (analyzing how legal disputes emerge and transform); and John Burton, Conflict 
Resolution as a Political Philosophy, 3 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SECURITY 62 (1991) 
(defining a dispute as a short-term disagreement revolving around conflicting, but 
negotiable, interests, and a conflict as a more deep-seated, nonnegotiable issue of basic 
ontological human needs). 
66 Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes, supra note 16, at 7.  
67 FOLLETT, supra note 19, at 67; see also Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of 
Invention, supra note 16, at 7 (discussing Follett’s work). 
68 FOLLETT, supra note 19, at 67–68. 
69 Id. at 68. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. 





have peace”72—is “the accepted, the approved, way of ending controversy.”73 
Although the most common way of resolving conflict, “no one really wants a 
compromise, because that means a giving up of something.”74 Using 
compromise or domination to squelch conflict will “achieve only a brief 
respite; the conflict will go underground and will eventually resurface in a 
more virulent form. A better way is to find the integrative solution, the 
approach that solves a conflict by accommodating the real demands of the 
parties involved.”75 
In the 1920s, long before Getting to Yes76 popularized interest-based 
bargaining, Follett advanced the concept of an integrated approach to conflict, 
particularly in organizational contexts.77 The integrated approach views 
conflict as a path to progress, which Follett explained in scientific terms as 
“setting friction to work, making it do something.”78 In her theory of 
integration, conflict is not a negative force to be extinguished, but a sign of 
health in organizations. She wrote, “[I]t is hoped that we shall always have 
conflict, the kind which leads to invention, to the emergence of new values.”79 
The goal is not to eliminate conflict, but to find the “plus-value” or what she 
called the “plusvalent” that emerges from exploring, and potentially 
integrating, differences.80 
Interest-based negotiation and mediation theory echo these themes of 
using an integrative approach to conflict. Integration seeks to reconcile 
multiple interests and, when possible, create a new understanding or approach. 
This may be most achievable in the context in which Follett was working—
labor and employment relations and business organizations, where on-going 
relationships matter, and where settling an isolated claim may not resolve on-
going systemic problems that are likely to reemerge if ignored or suppressed. 
She acknowledged, however, that integration is not “possible in all cases.”81 
The dispute resolution field examines this potential for “‘creativity’ in 
human conflict resolution.”82 In this account, conflicts—in all their messy 
rawness—can be vehicles for norm creation. Nils Christie, recognized as one 
 
72 Id.  
73 Id. at 69. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 21 (describing Follett’s theory of conflict integration). 
76 ROGER FISHER, WILLIAM URY & BRUCE PATTON, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (Houghton Mifflin 2d ed. 1991). 
77 Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention, supra note 16, at 7.  
78 FOLLETT, supra note 19, at 71. 
79 Id. at 72. 
80 Id. at 49, 50, 52. 
81 Id. at 72. 






of the theoretical founders of the restorative justice movement, argues that 
communities do not have too many conflicts, but too few.83 He viewed conflict 
as “social fuel” and lawyers and courts as “professional thieves” that “steal” 
conflicts and norm-clarification opportunities away from the individuals and 
communities most affected by and involved in the conflict.84  
Thus, we see at least two paths in ADR thought. The “dispute” 
resolution strand examines various modes of processing conflicts and legal 
disputes. This may include statutes or regulations, judicial adjudication, 
community-based or in-house mediation programs, court-based ADR, private 
ADR, or a range of other process configurations that supplement or supplant 
litigation. The dispute processing function seeks primarily to resolve the 
matter, through negotiation, mediation, or a decision by a third party (judge, 
private arbitrator, or neutral evaluator). Dispute resolution processes also 
explore proactive, “upstream” conflict prevention strategies, before the 
conflict arises or snowballs into a larger, more complex dispute. 
The second, more ambitious and sometimes controversial,85 sect in the 
ADR field analyzes the norm-creating, justice-promoting, equity-enhancing, 
and relationship-building potential of conflicts and the processes through 
which they are funneled. This includes dialogic processes such as restorative 
justice86 and mediation,87 as well as ombuds programs that provide “feedback 
 
83 Christie, supra note 53, at 3–8.  
84 Id. 
85 See, e.g., BERNARD S. MAYER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: CONFRONTING THE CRISIS IN 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION (2007). 
86 See, e.g., RESTORATIVE AND RESPONSIVE HUMAN SERVICES (Gale Burford, John 
Braithwaite & Valerie Braithwaite eds., 2019); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Restorative 
Justice: What Is It and Does It Work? 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 161 (2007); Lydia 
Nussbaum, Realizing Restorative Justice: Legal Rules and Standards for School Discipline 
Reform, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 583 (2018). 
87 Some mediators use a directive, settlement-focused approach, and others use a 
relational, problem solving approach. See Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ 
Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 7 (1996) (analyzing mediator orientations along an axis from a narrow focus on legal 
claims to a broad focus on relational concerns and mediator interventions along an axis 
from directive to facilitative); Kenneth Kressel et al., The Settlement-Orientation vs. the 
Problem-Solving Style in Custody Mediation, 50 J. SOC. ISSUES 67, 68 (1994) (a study 
comparing mediators who use a settlement-oriented style (SOS) and problem-solving style 
(PSS) and finding that PSS “produced a more structured and vigorous approach to conflict 
resolution during mediation, more frequent and durable settlements, and a generally more 
favourable attitude toward the mediation experience. SOS was not necessarily bad, but PSS 
was better”). Some mediation frameworks articulate specific social goals beyond the 
facilitation of dialogue and negotiation. Maryland Community Mediation has developed 
an “inclusive mediation” model to “bring the radical inclusion already deeply woven into 
 





loops” about systemic issues that need to be addressed in a workplace or 
agency.88 This branch also encompasses public conversation and dialogue 
initiatives,89 public policy conflict resolution,90 and dispute system design.91 
As Carrie Menkel-Meadow explained: “While ‘disputes’ may be about legal 
cases, conflicts are more broadly and deeply about human relations and 
transactions. Conflict ‘handling’ may be both more and less involving and 
complicated than ‘dispute settlement’ or ‘conflict management.’”92  
 
C. “Resolution:” A Limiting Frame 
 
Finally, “resolution” may be the most undertheorized and limiting—
yet most important—word in our descriptor. Nancy Welsh has cautioned that 
there has been too much focus on the “A” in ADR, but not on the other letters.93 
She observes, “the evolution and institutionalization of mediation—as well as 
the courts’ embrace and enforcement of mandatory arbitration outside of the 
commercial context—reveal the danger of defining our field solely in terms of 
 
the community mediation movement to the mediation table as a core belief and practice.” 
Caroline Harmon-Darrow, Lorig Charkoudian, Tracee Ford, Michele Ennis & Erricka 
Bridgeford, Defining Inclusive Mediation: Theory, Practice, and Research, 38 CONFLICT 
RESOL. Q. 305 (2020). Transformative mediation is based on surfacing “empowerment” 
and “recognition” in conflicts. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE 
PROMISE OF MEDIATION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT 13 (2d ed. 2004). 
Narrative mediation combines principles of family therapy and storytelling with mediation. 
John Winslade et al., A Narrative Approach to the Practice of Mediation, 14 NEGOT. J. 21, 
24–27 (1998).  
88 Susan Sturm & Howard Gadlin, Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change, 2007 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 1, 10. 
89 See The federal Community Relations Service uses structured dialogue to advance 
civil rights, address community divisions, and de-escalate conflicts. See BERTRAM LEVINE 
& GRANDE LUM, AMERICA’S PEACEMAKERS: THE COMMUNITY RELATIONS SERVICE AND 
CIVIL RIGHTS (2020). See also Richard Chasin et al., From Diatribe to Dialogue on 
Divisive Public Issues: Approaches Drawn from Family Therapy, 12 MEDIATION Q. 
(1996). 
90 See, e.g., The Ohio State Moritz College of Law’s Divided Community Project. See 
William Froehlich, Nancy H. Rogers & Joseph B. Stulberg, Sharing Dispute Resolution 
Practices with Leaders of a Divided Community or Campus: Nine Strategies for Two 
Crucial Conversations, 35 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RES. 781 (2020). 
91 Cathy A. Costantino & Christina Sickels-Merchant, DESIGNING CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: A GUIDE TO CREATING PRODUCTIVE & HEALTHY 
ORGANIZATIONS (1995); William L. Ury et al., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING 
SYSTEMS TO CUT THE COSTS OF CONFLICT (1988). 
92 Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes, supra note 16, at 12. 
93 Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from 






‘resolution.’”94 Welsh has urged the field to refocus on the role of justice in 
resolution.95 Carrie Menkel-Meadow has described process as “the human 
bridge between justice and peace.”96 
“Resolution” perpetuates the stereotype that a conflict or dispute 
needs to “settle” for a process to be successful. ADR has been criticized as 
elevating harmony and peace over concerns about inequality, legal rights, and 
power imbalances.97 Resolution sounds coercive in nature and mushy in result. 
As Mary Parker Follett put it: “no one really wants compromise, because that 
means giving up of something.”98 More recently, Bernard Mayer has observed 
that defining a field based on the “resolution” of conflict “misread[s] the 
essential nature and challenge of conflict.”99 He proposes that the conflict 
resolution field focus instead on “conflict engagement,” which would involve 
“helping people to raise, escalate, and continue a conflict” as well as resolve 
them when appropriate and desired.100  
Mayer was discussing the non-law conflict resolution field, not ADR 
in the legal context. His point has greater salience for lawyers, however, who 
are in the powerful position of being able to design dispute processes, advocate 
for clients in adversarial, litigation contexts, and negotiate for clients in deal-
making and problem-solving contexts. Most people seek out lawyers when 
they have a crisis or conflict because they want the attorney to help them 
vindicate or protect their rights, seek redress for injury, be made whole, or 
solve a problem. The lawyer must understand the conflict from the client’s 
perspective, what Bernard Mayer called a “client-centered conflict 
 
94 Id. 
95 See id.; see also Welsh, supra note 14 (analyzing mediation and procedural justice). 
Ellen Waldman has examined mediation and substantive justice. Ellen Waldman & Lola 
Akin Ojelabi, Mediators and Substantive Justice: A View from Rawls’ Original Position, 
30 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 391 (2016) (analyzing the applicability of Rawls’ theory 
of justice to mediation). Dispute resolution scholars have analyzed questions of access to 
justice and ADR. See Ellen E. Deason et al., ADR and Access to Justice: Current 
Perspectives, 33 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 303 (2018).  
96 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 61, at 579. 
97 Jerold S. Auerbach, Justice Without Law?, 33 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 517 (1983); see 
Laura Nader, Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierarchy and Pacification in 
the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology, 9 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (1993) 
(criticizing informal dispute resolution as elevating harmony and peace over concerns of 
substantive justice). 
98 Follet, supra note 19, at 69. 
99 MAYER, supra note 85, at 120. 
100 Id. at 39. 





specialist.”101 When a person feels wronged and angry, the idea of a settled 
“resolution” rather than court victory may seem insulting and inadequate.102  
Indeed, sometimes the best resolution of a conflict is no resolution at 
all. The desired objective may be best achieved through protest, storytelling, 
or dialogue, without a settlement. This has been explored as the “deliberative 
democracy” function of ADR.103 The conflict has intrinsic value in demanding 
attention and raising public consciousness (about injustice, inequality, etc.), 
inviting dialogue, and challenging or clarifying community norms.104 This 
notion echoes Nils Christie’s characterization of conflicts as valuable 
“property” that are necessary for the clarification of societal norms outside of 
formal legal processes.105 The Black Lives Matter and #MeToo movements 
offer recent examples of conflicts that have power in their own right—the goal 
is not necessarily to resolve a particular dispute, but to surface and examine 
the larger systemic problem of racial and gender oppression to raise public 
awareness and prompt social change.  
There has been increased attention in legal scholarship and practice 
about a broader range of process approaches that can facilitate authentic 
participation by voices left out of traditional legal systems106 and promote 
 
101 Id. 
102 Robert J. Condlin, The “Nature” of Legal Dispute Bargaining, 17 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 393 (2016) (analyzing the implications of cognitive neuroscience on 
legal dispute bargaining). 
103 Kruse, supra note 13, at 395–96 (questioning whether “harmony” is the goal of 
ADR theory and practice and noting that “in a pluralistic society, the features of fluidity 
and openness to continued challenge may be just as important as quelling of disputes.”); 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer’s Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy, 5 NEV. L.J. 
347, 348 (2004–2005) (exploring the “articulation of a process-oriented model of 
democratic deliberation and discourse”). 
104 Kruse, supra note 13, at 396 (describing the concept of “authentic participation” as 
part of the theory of justice in a deliberative democracy). See also David Bohm et al., 
Dialogue—A Proposal, INFED (1991), http://infed.org/archives/e–-
texts/bohm_dialogue.htm (describing the purpose of meaningful dialogue is to expose the 
incoherence in our thought and generate “collective learning”); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE 
THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: VOLUME 2, THE CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST 
REASON (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987).  
105 Christie, supra note 53, at 13.  
106 Kruse, supra note 13, at 392 (arguing that ADR theory needs to have “a vision of 
‘authentic participation’ that can distinguish legitimate . . . engagement in a process from 
its strategic manipulation”); Welsh, supra note 93, at 54 (applying social justice theory to 
mediation and ADR and exploring “the potential of the meditation process to empower and 






systemic legal reform.107 The most recent example centers on the application 
of restorative justice, mediation, and other conflict engagement strategies to a 
range of complex social issues such as intimate partner violence,108 sexual 
harassment and assault,109 criminal legal reform,110 school discipline and the 
“school-to-prison pipeline”,111 the foreclosure crisis,112 the eviction crisis,113 
community polarization and violence,114 and workplace discrimination.115  
Thus, the “R” in ADR should not simply mean “resolution” in the 
sense of a settlement or case closure. “R” also may mean process strategies 
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that advance rights, relationships, reform, responsive regulation,116 
reconciliation,117 restoration,118 reclamation,119 or reckoning.120 As political 
scientist Christine Harrington observed in her analysis of neighborhood justice 
centers: “Taking rights seriously can mean taking problem solving 
seriously.”121 She urged:  
 
We need to turn our attention to the 
substantive rights and claims for justice that 
are expressed in the dispute-processing 
context. Once we understand that the 
exercise of rights, making claims of rights, is 
an expression of social problems (e.g., social 
and economic inequality), then we can move 
forward with the view that rights are one 
context or framework in which social 
problem solving takes place.122 
 
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING ADR AS “CONFLICT PROCESS STRATEGY” 
 
Unpacking common misconceptions about ADR helps us to take stock 
of the historical roots and modern breadth of our work. As we look into the 
future, our challenge is to situate the field under a unified frame that captures 
the vast, diverse, impressive, and motley array of our scholarly and teaching 
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interests. A “conflict process strategy” framing helps us to explain the scope 
and relevance of the field to law, as well as to alternatives to traditional legal 
approaches. 
Overall, ADR tends to be a how-focused field—how the trifecta of 
negotiation, mediation and arbitration processes are used, how they should be 
conducted, how these processes impact the parties and other stakeholders, and 
how these processes compare to litigation.123 We also expound on the when of 
ADR—the considerations and criteria to examine to evaluate when a particular 
process may be appropriate for a particular type of conflict or dispute. Given 
our focus on process, this makes sense. In addition to continued exploration of 
what is happening in practice and how those processes affect parties, courts, 
and other constituencies, as a field we must remain ever vigilant about 
interrogating the why (and why not) of ADR.  
How do we look beyond the traditional “how” and “when” analysis of 
ADR processes and articulate a unifying theory that captures the full scope, 
purpose, and potential of our work? A common theme running through dispute 
resolution scholarship is, of course, process. Much like other legal scholars 
who focus on procedure, ADR legal scholars study and teach the theoretical 
underpinnings, uses, limitations, design, impact, and risks of various disputing 
processes. In this regard, we echo themes from the “Legal Process” movement 
from the 1950s.124 The next section explores lessons that this school of thought 
may offer to the modern ADR field. 
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The old Legal Process school has now given birth to 
several strains of “new legal process” sensitivity, 
recognizing that process is pluralistic and that 
different institutional arrangements of process are 
necessary to meet different kinds of individual and 
 





A. Legal Process: Early ADR Theory? 
 
Legal Process scholars attempted to synthesize a unified grand theory 
of the law and its institutional manifestations, including not only court 
adjudication, but also private ordering and public law. Henry Hart and Albert 
Sacks, leaders in the field, viewed law as “the aggregate of the processes of 
social ordering . . . [w]ith a view to promoting ends accepted as valid in the 
society.”125 Hart viewed the law’s role as “the task of creating and maintaining 
the conditions for collaboration among the members of society.”126  
This view, like modern ADR theory, is rather optimistic in its view 
that the goal of the law “is “not [ ] dividing up a pie of fixed size but [ ] making 
a larger pie in which all the slices will be bigger.’”127 Hart continued: “in any 
situation of conflict of interest within a society it is always possible to work 
out a solution in which all interests are better off than they were before.”128 If 
this sounds like the principles underlying Getting to Yes, that is no accident. 
Michal Albertstein has traced the lineage from the legal process school of 
thought of the 1950s to Roger Fisher’s negotiation and problem solving 
mediation theories of the 1980s, noting that “Roger Fisher himself 
acknowledged the influence of the legal process school on his work, and 
claimed to have adopted their attitude.”129 
While the Legal Process movement focused primarily on public law 
and the institutional relationship between legislative and judicial process, Hart 
and Sacks emphasized the importance of private ordering as part of law and 
the “broad dispersion of decisionmaking.”130 They argued that "private 
 
institutional needs. In one sense, the “new legal 
process” represented by ADR is a direct descendant 
of Hart and Sacks’s Legal Process school, 
recognizing a greater diversity of legal processes 
that are responsible for maintaining social order. 
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ordering is the primary process of social adjustment,"131 dedicating a chapter 
to private ordering in their posthumously-published Legal Process. Hart and 
Sacks recognized court adjudication as “the slender tip of ‘the great pyramid 
of legal order’ and examined many other ways that disputes were resolved.”132 
They argued: “Speedy, orderly and amicable adjustments of private affairs are 
always to be preferred to controversy. Avoidable litigation never serves to 
maximize the satisfaction of human wants, or to promote the common good in 
any other way.”133  
Given their emphasis on private ordering, Hart and Sacks viewed 
negotiation as a core competency for lawyers. They observed: “Negotiation is 
informal and flexible in its procedure whereas the procedure of adjudication is 
formal and rigid. Negotiation is far better adapted than adjudication to securing 
the pre-condition of a satisfactory agreement —namely, a sympathetic 
understanding of the other party's point of view.”134 They advised that lawyers 
must develop “skill in negotiation in finding the common ground of mutual 
advantage between the parties.”135  
Sounding much like modern ADR professors, Hart and Sacks urged: 
“The principles and modes of autonomous ordering and its limitations, are of 
utmost importance for a lawyer to study and understand.”136 Specifically, their 
teaching materials emphasized that lawyers need to understand the range of 
public and private process options and select the best process for the unique 
circumstances. As Anthony Sebok noted: “A recurrent theme in The Legal 
Process is the idea that a good lawyer should develop the judgment needed to 
pick the technique appropriate for the type of problem at hand. The book, thus, 
frequently asks the student to weigh the comparative advantages of decision 
making through private agreement, majority voting, administrative dictate, 
arbitration, or adjudication.”137 As Kent Roach observed in his analysis of The 
Legal Process: “Hart and Sacks’s defence of private ordering resembles 
contemporary advocacy of ADR. This includes not only praise for the speed 
and flexibility of negotiation, but also the tendency to subject adjudication to 
cost-benefit analysis without being concerned that private solutions may 
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replicate existing power distributions.”138 Like those in the ADR field, “they 
were aware that self-regulation could preserve privacy, speed, good will, and 
continuing relationships.”139 
Lon Fuller, another member of the Legal Process school, expounded 
on various process-based forms of social ordering, including adjudication, 
mediation, arbitration, and more. Fuller conceived of law as “a ‘problem 
solving activity’” that included a range of different disputing processes, each 
with their own uses, morality, and limitations.140 Like Hart and Sacks, Fuller 
explored: “What kinds of human relations are best organized and regulated by 
adjudication, and what others are better left to other procedures, such as 
negotiation and voluntary settlement, majority vote, or expert managerial 
authority?”141 Fuller urged that a lawyer served an important function as 
“architect of structure”142 or “process architect.”143 
Fuller likewise theorized that private dispute processes are part of the 
infrastructure of the law and provide opportunities for norm creation.144 He 
observed, for example, that “mediation is commonly directed, not toward 
achieving conformity to norms, but toward the creation of the relevant norms 
themselves.”145 He suggested that “[a] serious study of mediation can serve . . 
. to offset the tendency of modern thought to assume that all social order must 
be imposed by some kind of ‘authority’.”146  
Fuller, as well as Hart and Sacks, did not simply set forth a taxonomy 
of process options. They were not against adjudication or settlement but for a 
multiplicity of processes to improve the overall human condition and social 
order. They theorized the benefits and limits of adjudication and other private 
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process structures and sought to develop in lawyers the ability to assess when 
disputes are best resolved by courts, and when they should be addressed by 
the parties most involved in the matter, who must abide by the result. Hart and 
Sacks wrote, for example: "To the extent that the resolution of the dispute 
depends essentially upon what Professor Fuller calls the principle of order by 
reciprocity, as distinguished from the principle of order through common ends 
(including the maintenance of a regime of reciprocity), the method of 
adjudication operates to eliminate the best judges of a satisfactory exchange—
namely, the parties to the exchange themselves . . . . "147 
Fuller appreciated the relational aspects of mediation. He recognized 
the “central quality of mediation [is] its capacity to reorient the parties toward 
each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a 
new and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect 
their attitudes and dispositions toward one another.”148 His view of mediation 
was formed largely by the collective bargaining context, in which the purpose 
of the mediator is:  
 
[T]o induce the mutual trust and 
understanding that will enable the parties to 
work out their own rules. The creation of 
rules is a process that cannot itself be rule-
bound; it must be guided by a sense of shared 
responsibility and a realization that the 
adversary aspects of the operation are part of 
a larger collaborative undertaking.149  
 
Fuller observed the “mutual understanding produced by the process of 
negotiation itself.”150 In a sentence perhaps well-known to contracts 
professors, he observed: “If you negotiate the contract thoroughly, explore 
carefully the problems that can arise in the course of its administration, work 
out the proper language to cover the various contingencies that may develop, 
you can then put the contract in a drawer and forget it.”151 That is essentially 
what mediation entails—the negotiation of a contract (i.e., settlement 
agreement), with the potential to improve the parties’ relationship and mutual 
understanding into the future. This may partly explain studies finding that 
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agreements reached through mediation are less likely to require future court 
involvement or enforcement actions as compared to judge-imposed orders.152 
The Legal Process movement faded in the 1960s and 1970s in part 
because of the fracturing of legal theory between law and economics and 
critical legal theory, and perhaps because the field’s leaders passed on without 
publishing their casebook and fully addressing issues of equality and civil 
rights.153 Nevertheless, its fundamental precepts remain influential and 
provide several lessons and cautionary tales as the ADR field looks to the 
future. While this is only a brief snapshot of a deep and rich field of study,154 
the next sections explore how the insights about the relationship of informal 
dispute processing to the law from the Legal Process school may help the ADR 
field clarify its purpose and continuing relevance to law and legal education. 
 
D. Lawyer as “Conflict Process Strategist” 
 
The first lesson is that the theory of process and the practice of process 
strategy are central components of law and core competencies for lawyers. 
The Legal Process school did not view process options as a zero-sum, 
“adjudication versus private settlement” dichotomy. They did not simply list 
a taxonomy of process options and blanket criteria for the selection of each 
process. Rather, they theorized the potential uses, limits, and morality of each 
process as it pertained to the overall operation and development of the law. 
They recognized private disputing processes as core components and 
complementary sources of norm creation and social ordering in the law.  
Legal Process theory did not view private dispute resolution as 
necessarily better than adjudication for all purposes and contexts. Rather, it 
depended upon the case and client-specific context. In their view, lawyers 
must understand the normative underpinnings of various adjudicative, 
legislative, and private dispute resolution processes. They also needed to 
develop the judgment and skills—both advocacy and negotiation skills—to 
navigate these processes. 
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Likewise, modern ADR theory emphasizes the importance of process 
choices,155 examining the fluidity between private and public processes and 
the lawyer’s role as process strategist in various contexts. Situating ADR 
under the broader rubric of conflict process theory and strategy helps to 
account for the field’s advancement beyond the traditional trifecta of 
negotiation, mediation, and arbitration. The conflict process conceptualization 
of the ADR field emphasizes the lawyer’s role as process architect, advisor, 
advocate, negotiator, and problem solver within different process structures.  
A process strategy frame emphasizes what we hope law students learn 
as they transition into their work as lawyers, judges, and leaders; that is, the 
processes they use to accomplish client goals, address conflicts, or effect 
positive change are as important as the governing substantive law. Without 
wise process decisions, substantive rights cannot be vindicated. At the same 
time, focusing on substantive rights to the exclusion of other considerations, 
such as financial and relational costs, can sometimes be counterproductive or 
harmful. In addition, the design and navigation of process choices have 
profound normative implications for access to justice, procedural justice, 
remedies, and public values. In this regard, ADR has much in common with 
public interest lawyering theory, which recognizes that a range of process 
strategies beyond litigation are necessary to facilitate legal reform and social 
justice.156  
 
E. The “Science” of Conflict Process Strategies 
 
The ADR field has been criticized as being rather evangelical, 
advocating that certain types of processes are universally better than others, 
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regardless of context.157 Within some subfields of ADR (mediation or 
restorative justice, for example), some claim that their approach to the practice 
is always superior. More ADR—or any particular process or practice 
framework—is not necessarily beneficial for all cases and contexts, and may 
present significant dangers or harms for some.  
The ADR field must continue to turn the mirror inward, inviting 
scrutiny of the limitations, quality, and unintended consequences of various 
process strategies. The next generation of ADR scholarship is already digging 
into the “black box” of ADR to empirically test158 and gather transparent 
data159 about various processes. Rigorous research about the use and impact of 
various informal processes is underway, including examination of litigant 
process preferences,160 empirical analysis of the impact of specific mediator 
techniques in various case contexts,161 and closer scrutiny of the use and 
outcomes of court-based mediation and arbitration. This research improves the 
quality of disputing processes and informs ADR theory and practice.  
 
F. The Morality of Conflict Process Strategies 
 
This leads to a final lesson from the Legal Process movement or, more 
importantly, from its ultimate demise: the ADR field must shift “beyond 
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settlement” and neutrality to tackle normative questions about the impact of 
process choices on substantive justice and the generation of public norms. 
Here, the ADR field must continue to examine, in Fullerian style, not only the 
uses, limits, and effectiveness of various processes but also the underlying 
morality and quality of the processes.  
The ADR field sometimes asks: Do we teach ADR as it is practiced, 
or do we teach ADR as it ought to be? In our scholarship and in our teaching, 
the ought to be—the purpose, governing values, ethical limits, and integrity of 
the process—is essential. Returning to the genericide theme with which I 
began, if we do not continually question and theorize what ADR ought to be 
(and what it should not be), ADR will be reduced to a commodified, diluted 
product that equates to whatever you want it to be. When the legal system is 
adopting, and especially, requiring private dispute processes, we must 
continually interrogate their operation, including how they interact with legal 
norms and a lawyer’s “special responsibility for “the quality of justice.”162 
These questions have been explored in prior ADR scholarship, and there is 
more work to do in this regard into the future.  
A focus on conflict process theory and strategy provides a more 
comprehensive and nuanced account of how private and community-based 
dispute strategies intersect with traditional legal systems to prevent and engage 
conflicts and address injustice. It frees us to be nimble, adapting to changing 
societal and client needs, new process structures, and technologies.163 A 
broader process lens frees us to explore not only reactive processes that 
respond to disputes but also proactive and preventive conflict processes (such 
as restorative justice, dispute system design, policy reform, processes aimed 
at consensus-building and organizational change).  
The application of conflict process strategies to promote equity and 
social justice is likely to be the next frontier of ADR interdisciplinary 
scholarship. This work is animated by concerns of the voices left out of 
traditional legal, and conventional ADR, processes and is influenced by 
critical and feminist legal theory, deliberative democracy, and 
intersectionality. Legal scholars across many disciplines are studying and 
applying new process frameworks to systemic social issues to, for example, 
empower survivors of violence and assault, reform the criminal legal system, 
stem the school-to-prison pipeline, disrupt evictions, de-escalate violence, and 
reduce workplace discrimination. While no process is a panacea for any 
problem, conflict process theory and strategy provides a lens through which to 
 
162 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT PREAMBLE & SCOPE 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2000).  
163 See Noam Ebner, Teaching the World: Educational Pivots for the Second Half of 
the ADR Century, 35 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 825 (2020). 





examine the uses, benefits, and shortcomings of various process structures in 




The dispute resolution field is in a time of transition, with many of the 
pioneers who blazed trails for us moving on or close to retirement. While we 
celebrate the tremendous growth of ADR over the past few decades, some are 
concerned, if not downright panicked, that the future of ADR in the legal 
academy and in the courts looks bleak. 
Consistent with our field’s mantra of turning crisis into opportunity, 
let us welcome this challenge with the same candid self-reflection and open-
minded creativity that we ask of mediation participants. This article takes stock 
of what the ADR field is, and is not, to help identify our future path. In many 
ways, that picture is hopeful: ADR is well embedded within legal education 
and implemented in courts, legal institutions, businesses, and communities. 
But there are ominous signs. Rapid institutionalization of ADR practices 
without clear governing norms has diluted the quality of some processes and 
often outpaced theorization and scholarly scrutiny. In addition, our descriptor 
misrepresents the field as remaining in opposition to litigation, while our work 
has expanded far beyond the traditional trifecta of negotiation, mediation, and 
arbitration. 
Drawing lessons from Legal Process theory and the increasing interest 
in alternative processes as affirmative means to vindicate rights and promote 
social justice, one path forward is to reconceptualize the work of the ADR 
field with a simple unifying theme: conflict process theory and strategy. This 
framing is both broader and more precise, capturing the focus and scope of our 
collective teaching, scholarship, and practice. With this conceptual 
foundation, the ADR field can continue to explore the uses, benefits, 
limitations, dangers, and morality of various conflict process strategies and 
structures to accomplish a range of goals in law and society “beyond 
settlement.” In a world full of inevitable conflict, we will always have much 
work to do. 
